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Prior literature shows that choices regarding board composition are 
associated with earnings management. In this study we add to this 
literature by examining the effects of the presence of a foreign board 
member on earnings management. Using a sample of 3,249 firm-year 
observations representing 586 non-financial listed Nordic firms during 
2001–2008, we find that the presence of a non-Nordic, foreign director 
is associated with significantly higher levels of earnings management.. 
We obtain largely similar findings from OLS, an instrumental variables 
approach, and propensity score matching. Moreover, we provide 
preliminary evidence that differences in accounting knowledge, rather 
than language-related factors, drive this effect. Our results favor the 
interpretation that it may not necessarily be beneficial to appoint a 





One of the main responsibilities of the board of directors is to ensure the quality of the 
firm’s financial statements. This is a legal requirement in most countries and is 
highlighted as one of the fundamental principles of good corporate governance (OECD, 
2004). It is generally accepted that the quality of the firm’s financial statements is 
compromised when corporate decision makers implement earnings management 
opportunistically. Earnings management refers to choices made by corporate decision 
makers using accounting methods offered by law and regulations to influence a firm’s 
reported earnings (cf. Chen et al., 2014).  
 Prior research has documented the importance of the board of directors in the 
financial reporting process in general and in mitigating earnings management in 
particular (e.g., Larcker et al., 2007; Dechow et al., 2010). Specifically, a growing 
literature shows that board characteristics, such as board independence (e.g., Hwang & 
Kim, 2009; Bruyneels & Cardinaels, 2014), the presence of an audit committee (e.g., 
Klein, 2002; García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009), and female representation on the 
board (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Srinidhi et al., 2011) are associated with reduced 
levels of earnings management.  
 Our study contributes to this literature by adding an international dimension, i.e. 
the presence of a foreign board member on the firm’s board. In particular, we claim that 
having one or more foreign board members may potentially reduce a board’s ability to 
ensure the quality of the financial statements. To support this claim, we argue that 
foreign board members are more likely to suffer from a lack of knowledge of local 
(accounting) rules and/or that their presence makes the board vulnerable to language 
issues, which hampers board effectiveness and, hence, increases earnings management. 
As such, our research is part of an emerging field that focuses on the antecedents and 
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consequences of the internationalization of the board of directors (see, e.g., Oxelheim & 
Randøy, 2005; Masulis et al., 2012; Oxelheim et al., 2013; Attig et al., 2014; Piekkari et 
al., 2014.  
 We investigate the association between the presence of foreign directors and 
earnings management using a sample of 3,249 firm-year observations representing 586 
non-financial listed Nordic firms during 2001–2008. We find the Nordic region (i.e., 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) to be particularly useful as a context for our 
research, as the number of firms with an internationalized board is relatively high in 
Nordic firms (Oxelheim et al., 2013). Moreover, the number of Nordic firms with an 
internationalized board has increased substantially in the past decade.  
 As earnings management involves an inherently unobservable process (cf. Nam et 
al., 2014), we use discretionary accruals to detect the level of earnings management 
(e.g., Klein, 2002; Srinidhi et al., 2011). After controlling for several variables 
associated with earnings management, we find that the presence of a non-Nordic, 
foreign director is associated with significantly higher levels of earnings management, 
favoring the notion that these foreign directors are less effective monitors. We obtain 
largely similar findings from OLS, an instrumental variables approach and propensity 
score matching. We further explore reasons why foreign board members are less 
effective monitors and find some supportive evidence for the notion that they lack the 
specific knowledge of national accounting rules and laws. Our results favor the 
interpretation that appointing a foreign director to the board of directors can reduce the 
board’s ability to discipline managers as far as earnings management is concerned.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the 
relevant literature and states the hypothesis. The third section presents the research 
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design, and the fourth section provides the empirical analyses and results. The last 
section gives the concluding remarks. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
A key premise of agency theory is that firms characterized by a separation of ownership 
and control are fraught with agency problems between managers and shareholders (e.g., 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders provides self-interested managers with the opportunity to 
behave opportunistically and to increase their personal wealth at the expense of the 
shareholders. One manifestation of agency problems is lower earnings quality as 
indicated, for instance, by higher levels of earnings management. Healy and Wahlen 
(1999, p. 368) define earnings management as behavior in which corporate decision 
makers use judgment in financial accounting to alter financial reports in an attempt to 
either mislead the shareholders about the firm’s performance or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.  
 Following agency theory, the board of directors is a crucial mechanism to constrain 
managers’ opportunistic behavior. In particular, prior accounting literature shows that 
the choice regarding board composition comprises an important governance mechanism 
to mitigate earnings management (e.g., Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; Dechow et al., 
2010). Specifically, research shows that to curb earnings management a board should 
mainly comprise independent directors (e.g., Klein, 2002; Hwang & Kim, 2009; 
Bruyneels & Cardinaels, 2014), should have at least one female director (e.g., Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009; Srinidhi et al., 2011), and should have installed an audit committee (e.g., 
Klein, 2002; García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009). In this study, we focus on how 
the internationalization of a corporate board—i.e., hiring a foreign board member—can 
affect the board’s ability to ensure the quality of financial statements. 
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 There are two competing views in the literature that may explain the possible 
impact of foreign directors on earnings management. One view is that the presence of 
foreign directors increases the effectiveness of the board of directors and, thus helps to 
curb earnings management. As foreign directors usually do not come from the same 
pool of directors (e.g., Ruigrok et al., 2007; Edling et al., 2012), i.e., come from outside 
the “old boys network,” it is likely that boards that include at least one foreign director 
are associated with a growing tendency of directors to emphasize openness and 
frankness in performing their monitoring tasks, rather than giving priority to politeness 
and courtesy among board members (cf. Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003; Chiu et al., 2010). 
At the same time, the presence of foreign directors may help prevent too high levels of 
cohesiveness1 of the board (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). That is, as these directors come 
from outside the (local or national) inner circle of directors, they are more likely to 
exhibit independent thinking and to feel less reluctant to raise controversial issues. This 
may benefit discussions within the boardroom and potentially contribute to increased 
monitoring effectiveness (cf. Srinidhi et al., 2011). Moreover, foreign directors may 
bring different viewpoints to the boardroom given their different backgrounds and 
experiences. Again, this may raise the effectiveness of boards when it comes to carrying 
out their monitoring task. 
 The combination of these effects is likely to foster an environment in which tougher 
questions are asked. This view, which emphasizes that the presence of a foreign director 
contributes to a board that is more likely to critically scrutinize the manager, suggests 
that the presence of a foreign director is associated with reduced levels of earnings 
management. Accordingly, this line of reasoning suggests the following hypothesis: 
                                                        
1
 Following Forbes and Milliken (1999, p. 493) cohesiveness refers to “the degree to which board 
members are attracted to each other and are motivated to stay on the board. [...] Cohesiveness captures the 




Hypothesis 1: There is a negative association between the presence of a foreign 
director in the board of directors and the level of earnings management. 
 A competing view emphasizes that foreign directors may be less well-equipped to 
perform their monitoring tasks. Foreign directors can be less effective monitors for 
reasons related to lack of knowledge of accounting rules as well as due to language 
issues.  
 First, a foreign director may be less familiar with local laws, regulations and 
governance standards in general and local accounting rules in particular (Masulis et al., 
2012). This (relative) unfamiliarity with local accounting rules may impair the foreign 
director’s ability to effectively evaluate the level of opportunism in the manager’s 
judgment in financial accounting. Specifically, prior literature suggests that domain-
specific knowledge of accounting is important for a director to monitor the manager’s 
financial reporting practices and to mitigate the manager’s tendencies to engage in 
earnings management. According to Dhaliwal et al. (2010, p. 792), financial reporting 
issues involve high levels of technical details and, hence, a high degree of knowledge of 
accounting rules are required to recognize critical accounting issues at such high levels 
of earnings management. Indeed, in line with this conjecture, evidence demonstrates 
that boards including at least one individual with financial (accounting) expertise are 
associated with higher financial reporting quality (e.g., Zhang et al., 2007; Krishnan & 
Visvanathan, 2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2010). While since 2005 national and international 
generally accepted accounting standards have converged in Europe as a consequence of 
the requirement that publicly listed companies have to prepare financial statements in 
accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS),2 this was not 
                                                        
2
 Indeed, Barth et al. (2008) show that firms adopting IFRS show an improvement in reporting quality in 
terms of earnings management, timely loss recognition, and value relevance. Moreover, Marra et al. 




the case in the pre-IFRS period. Hence, at least in the pre-IFRS period, a high degree of 
local (i.e., national) accounting knowledge was required to effectively monitor the 
financial reporting process; knowledge that foreign directors are not likely to possess. 
 A second potential obstacle a foreign director faces is language (see, e.g., Kassis-
Henderson, 2005, 2010; Tenzer et al., 2013; Piekkari et al., 2014). Although English 
seems to be the lingua franca of boards that include a foreign director (e.g., Piekkari et 
al., 2014), language potentially affects the effectiveness of the board in two ways. To 
begin with, at the individual level language may impair the director’s ability to 
effectively contribute to discussions in the boardroom (Piekkari et al., 2014). 
Specifically, a director’s proficiency in English is likely to affect her cognitive 
processing and communication abilities (Kassis-Henderson, 2010). Not feeling 
comfortable in using English may for instance increase a director’s insecurity and 
feelings of anxiety (Tenzer et al., 2013), which may negatively affect the extent to 
which an individual director contributes to discussions in the boardroom (Piekkari et al., 
2014).  
 Moreover, at the board level research suggests that language affects interpersonal 
trust relations and the working atmosphere in teams (e.g., Kassis-Henderson, 2005; 
Tenzer et al., 2013). These aspects are crucial for any group, but particularly for groups 
that meet sporadically (Forbes & Milliken, 1999), as these aspects contribute to an 
environment that stimulates discussion and collaboration. For instance, native and non-
native speakers differ in terms of the ability to hear messages “between the lines” as 
well as in terms of the level of formality they consider appropriate when addressing 
each other (e.g., Kassis-Henderson, 2010). Indeed, Forbes and Milliken (1999, p. 499) 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the one hand, and earnings management, on the other, is stronger in the post-IFRS period than in the pre-
IFRS period. They attribute this effect to the higher level of disclosure and transparency inherent in IFRS, 
which according to Marra et al. (2011) makes it easier for directors to identify and monitor the accounting 
policies applied by the firm. 
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note that as board members meet only episodically, “they are unlikely to have time to 
fully resolve the attitudinal and linguistic differences that divide them”. Hence, as a 
consequence of linguistic differences in general and differences in proficiency in 
English in particular, boards are vulnerable to “interaction difficulties that prevent 
groups from achieving their full potential” (Forbes & Milliken, 1999, p. 492).  
 The above discussion stresses that foreign directors are associated with lax 
monitoring of managers due to lack of knowledge and language issues. Accordingly, 
this line of reasoning suggests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive association between the presence of a foreign 
director in the board of directors and the level of earnings management. 
3. Research design 
3.1.Data source and sample 
Our sample is based on the population of all publicly traded non-financial firms 
headquartered in Denmark, Finland, Norway or Sweden. These four Nordic countries 
have a number of legal and linguistic aspects in common. The Nordic countries 
comprise a relatively homogeneous region in terms of financial reporting regulation and 
practices (Aisbett, 2001, 2002; Caban-Garcia & He, 2013). Regarding the linguistic 
aspects, Piekkari et al. (2014) note that the Nordic region represents a region with a 
high degree of proficiency in English, while at the same time three of the four languages 
(i.e., Danish, Norwegian and Swedish) resemble each other as they are Scandinavian 
languages and belong to family of Germanic idioms.  
 Our initial sample includes all listed, non-financial firms headquartered in a Nordic 
country at the end of 2006. For these firms, we manually collect data for that year on 
relevant board variables, such as the identities of the CEO and directors, their 
nationality, gender, and date of first appointment of the chairman to the board. On the 
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basis of this first round, the data collection was then extended to include each of the 
years 2001–2008.3 Complete information with respect to the aforementioned director 
aspects were available for a total of 3,428 firm-year observations relating to 617 unique 
firms. 
 Next, for our empirical analysis, the hand-collected director data was merged with 
financial data from Compustat Global; and the information on market capitalization 
came from Datastream. This reduced the unbalanced sample to 3,249 firm-year 
observations (comprising 668 firm-year observations for Denmark, 685 for Finland, 480 
for Norway and 1,416 for Sweden) representing 586 unique firms, for which we have 
all necessary data. 
3.2. Variables 
Dependent variable 
Consistent with numerous accounting and finance studies, we employ the absolute value 
of the discretionary (or abnormal) accruals as a proxy for earnings management (e.g., 
Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Peasnell et al., 2005; Larcker et al., 2007; Ghosh & 
Olsen, 2009; Katz, 2009; Peek et al., 2013). Specifically, and similar to recent studies, 
we focus on working capital accruals, as they are relatively easy to manage, but are less 
easy to detect by investors (e.g., Xie et al., 2003; Peek et al., 2013). We identify the 
“non-discretionary” accruals using the Modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). In 
the Modified Jones model, the discretionary accruals proxy is the residual from a linear 
regression of working capital accruals on change in sales (after subtracting the change 
in accounts receivables) or:  
 
                                                        
3
 To secure data validity, we verified the identification of foreigners using BoardEx (for the largest 
companies), Bloomberg’s Executive Profile & Biography, Forbes, tax-related information (when publicly 
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where WCAit denotes the working capital accruals of firm i in year t,4 ATit-1 the 
total assets of firm i in year t-1, ∆REVit the change in revenues of firm i in year 
t, and ∆ARit the change in accounts receivable of firm i in year t. The absolute value of 
εit in equation (1) is our dependent variable (MJ_ABSOLUTE). 
 As Peek et al. (2013) observe, in most U.K. and U.S. based studies the models used 
to estimate discretionary accruals are estimated by industry and year. However, this 
approach, they remark, is not feasible in many cross-country studies given the small 
sample sizes of the several countries. This limitation also applies to our study. 
Therefore, and in line with the approach used in Peek et al. (2013), we estimate the 
Modified Jones model by country, industry, and time period, where we distinguish two 
time periods: 2001–2004 and 2005–2008, with the last period coinciding with the first 
four years after the adoption of IFRS. The industry classification is based on one-digit 
SIC codes. 
Explanatory variables 
Our explanatory variables intend to measure the impact of the presence of at least one 
foreign director (D_FOREIGN) on the firm’s board of directors on the level of earnings 
management. However, the four Nordic countries in our sample comprise a rather 
homogeneous region and there seems to be a Nordic labor market for directors (rather 
than separate markets for Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish directors. Board 
interlocks are a well-known phenomenon in the Nordic countries where the pool of 
                                                        
4
 Working capital accruals are defined as: (∆Current assetsit - ∆Cashit) - (∆Current liabilitiesit - ∆Long 
term debt in current liabilitiesit - ∆Income taxes payableit), where ∆variableit denotes the change in that 
variable from year t-1 to t for firm i. 
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qualified candidates is limited (Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003; Piekkari et al., 2014). For 
instance, Piekkari et al. (2014) indicate that the Nordic countries have a “corporate 
environment that can be characterized as a “small world” in that trust, information and 
reputation of individual board members spread quickly and shape board behavior 
(Sinani et al., 2008).” Therefore, next to focusing on foreign board members in general, 
we also construct an indicator variable (D_NONNORDIC), which assumes the value of 
one if at least one non-Nordic foreigner sits on the board of directors and zero 
otherwise.  
Control variables 
Although the presence of foreign directors might affect board monitoring and decision 
making, other variables also influence board oversight and, hence, the level of earnings 
management. Therefore, and consistent with prior research, we control for a number of 
governance- and firm-specific variables that affect the level of earnings management.  
 Governance-specific control variables: First, we include BOARD_SIZE measured 
as the logarithm of the number of directors and serves as a measure of board 
effectiveness (e.g., Peasnell et al., 2005; Cheng, 2008; Chiu et al., 2013). Second, we 
include AUDITCOM, an indicator variable that assumes the value of one if the firm has 
an audit committee, and zero otherwise. Prior research demonstrates that the presence of 
a separate sub-committee within the board focusing on financial reporting issues is an 
important mechanism to curb earnings management (e.g., Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; 
Dechow et al., 2010).5 Third, we include CEO_BOARD, an indicator variable that 
assumes the value of one if the CEO sits on the board. As indicated by Oxelheim et al. 
(2013) the Nordic countries have a so-called “semi-two-tier” system, which allows (but 
                                                        
5
 While annual reports of Nordic firms frequently include information regarding the presence of an audit 
committee, they rarely disclose the identity of the directors that sit on the audit committee. Hence, data 
availability precluded us from testing the effects of the presence of foreign directors on the firm’s audit 
committee on the level of earnings management. 
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does not require) one executive (the CEO) to sit on the board of directors. Arguably, 
and similar to CEO duality in the United Kingdom and United States (e.g., Xie et al., 
2003; Peasnell et al., 2005; Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Srinidhi et al., 2011; Bruyneels & 
Cardinaels, 2014), allowing the CEO to sit on the board of directors could impair the 
ability of the board to exercise oversight (e.g., Adams et al., 2010).  
 Fourth, we also include TENURE_CHAIR, measured as the logarithm of the 
number of years the incumbent chairman served as chairman. It can be expected that a 
more experienced chairman is associated with more effective oversight (e.g., Dhaliwal 
et al., 2010; Chan et al., 2013). Lastly, as recent research shows that the presence of one 
or more female directors is associated with tougher monitoring in general and reduced 
levels of earnings management in particular (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Srinidhi et al., 
2011), we also control for female representation on the firm’s board of directors. 
Specifically, we include D_FEMALE, an indicator variable that takes on the value of 
one if the board of directors includes at least one female, and zero otherwise.  
 Firm-specific control variables: Apart from the board characteristics, we include a 
number of firm characteristics, including FIRM_SIZE (measured by the logarithm of the 
firms’ total assets in constant year-2000 prices in million euros), D_LOSS (an indicator 
variable that assumes the value of one if the firm experienced a loss in a certain year 
and zero otherwise), ROA (return on assets, defined as EBIT divided by total assets), 
and Market-to-Book (MTB), defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the 
book value of total assets. Prior studies (e.g., Xie et al., 2003; Peasnell et al., 2005; 
Larcker et al., 2007; Zao & Chen, 2008; Ghosh & Olsen, 2009; Dhaliwal et al., 2010; 
Srinidhi et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2013; Chiu et al., 2013; Bruyneels & Cardinaels, 
2014) show that these firm characteristics are associated with earnings management. 
Prior research shows that financial analysts comprise an important external governance 
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mechanism and that firms followed by more analysts have less discretion to manage 
their earnings (e.g., Yu, 2008; Degeorge et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2014). Therefore, we 
include a variable, ANALYSTCOV, measured as the logarithm of one plus the number of 
financial analysts following the firm (as reported in the I/B/E/S database). Finally, 
D_ANGLOLIST is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the firm’s 
shares are cross-listed in the U.S., and zero otherwise. Prior research shows that the 
financial reporting quality is higher for firms whose shares are cross-listed in the U.S. 
(e.g., Lang et al., 2003; Shi et al., 2012), possibly due to a tougher corporate 
governance and financial reporting regime. 
 We also include an indicator variable, PERIOD, which assumes the value of one 




Table 1, Panel A provides the summary statistics and Pearson correlations for the full 
sample. Regarding the test variable we observe that 20 percent of the boards have at 
least one non-Nordic board member.  
[Insert table 1 around here] 
 Table 1, Panel A also shows that the average board of our sample firms has almost 
7 members, with values ranging from 2 to 13. In 28 percent of the firm-year 
observations a separate audit committee was active. In our sample, the CEO sits on the 
board in about 42 percent of the firms. The average chairperson has 7.64 years of 
experience, which suggest a considerable amount of experience. 59 percent of the 
sampled boards of directors have at least one female board member; a figure that is 
considerably higher than found in U.S.-based research (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). A 
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firm is followed on average by 7 financial analysts. Only 3 percent of the firms are 
cross-listed in the U.S. 
 Table 1, Panel A further shows that an average firm in our final sample has a return 
on assets (ROA) of 3 percent, and in 28 percent of the firm-year observations the firm 
experienced a loss. The average size (in terms of the book value of assets) of the firms 
in our sample is €1.15 billion (in constant year-2000 prices).  
 Finally, table 1, provides the correlations for our main variables. The correlation 
patterns seen in Table 1, Panel A indicate no severe multicollinearity issues, except for 
a small number of cases. Specifically, we find high correlations among the test variables 
(which will be included separately in the regression analyses) as well as between 
FIRM_SIZE and BOARD_SIZE (ρ = 0.59), FIRM_SIZE and ANALYSTCOV (ρ = 0.75), 
and ROA and D_LOSS (ρ = -0.55). The variance inflation factors (not reported), 
however, indicate no multicollinearity problems. To minimize the impact of extreme 
values, we winsorize each of the continuous variables used in the regressions at the top 
and bottom 1 percent.  
 Table 1, Panel B provides information on the cross-country differences in terms of 
board internationalization. The differences appear to be rather substantial. Whereas 15 
per cent of all Danish firms have boards with at least one non-Nordic board member, 
this is 31.5 per cent for Norwegian firms. Table 1, Panel C shows that the percentage of 
boards having at least one non-Nordic board member has increased substantially over 
time, from 17 percent in 2001 to 24 percent in 2008.   
4.2. Main hypotheses testing 
Table 2 presents the main results with absolute abnormal accruals based on Modified 
Jones as the dependent variable. To test our empirical predictions, we use OLS 
regression with standard errors clustered by firm.  
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 We start our empirical analysis showing that the presence of foreign directors per 
se—i.e. also including, for instance, cases where a Swedish individual is the only 
foreign director on the board of a firm headquartered in Norway—is not statistically 
significantly associated with earnings management. Specifically, column (1) of Table 2 
shows that the effects of D_FOREIGN on absolute abnormal accruals are statistically 
not significant (β = 0.01; n.s.). A plausible explanation for this insignificant effect may 
be that the four countries comprise a relatively homogeneous region in terms of 
financial reporting regulations and practices (Aisbett, 2002, 2001; Caban-Garcia & He, 
2013). Moreover, three languages (Danish, Norwegian and Swedish) resemble each 
other (Piekkari et al., 2014). Hence, the mere presence of a foreign director on boards of 
Nordic firms does not necessarily result in dynamics caused by a more internationalized 
board as it also involves foreign individuals who resemble “local” directors. Because of 
this, differences in familiarity with local accounting rules and/or difficulties in 
communication due to language may not pose a major barrier to those Nordic boards 
where the only foreigner(s) is (are) from another Nordic country in performing their 
monitoring tasks. 
 Next we turn our attention to the effects of foreign directors who come from 
outside the Nordic region. As Table 2, column (2) shows, the effects of D_ 
NONNORDIC on absolute abnormal accruals are statistically significant and positive (β 
= 0.02; p-value < 0.05). The results indicate that boards of directors that include at least 
one non-Nordic foreigner are associated with higher levels of earnings management and 
thus are in line with our hypothesis 2, i.e. there is a positive association between the 
presence of a foreign director in the board of directors and the level of earnings 
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management due to a lack of knowledge and/or due to language issues.6 The 
coefficients regarding the control variables are generally in line with prior research, 
even though some variables (e.g., FIRM_SIZE, ANALYSTCOV and D_ANGLOLIST) are 
not statistically significant. 
[Insert table 2 around here] 
4.3. Alternative measures for board internationalization and discretionary accruals 
To check the robustness of the previous findings we first construct an indicator variable 
for the presence of at least two non-Nordic directors on the board (i.e., if 
D_NONNORDIC2 = 1, the board has two or more non-Nordic foreigners on the board 
of directors; and zero otherwise); i.e., a possible nonlinear relationship between foreign 
directors and earnings management may be present (cf. Srinidhi et al., 2011). The 
results in Table 3, column (1) indicate that boards having at least two non-Nordic board 
members are associated with higher levels of earnings management (β = 0.02; p-value < 
0.05).7  
    [Insert table 3 around here]  
 To further verify the robustness of our results, we construct a second variable, 
PERC_NONNORDIC, representing the percentage of non-Nordic directors in the board. 
The positive association between the presence of a foreign directors and the level of 
earnings management due to a lack of knowledge and/or due to language issues may be 
affected when the proportion of foreign boards increases. The results in column (2) of 
Table 3 confirm the idea that a higher percentage of non-Nordic directors in the board is 
associated with more earnings management (β = 0.07; p-value < 0.05). 
                                                        
6
 We also estimated the results based on a cross-sectional annual (rather than periodic) estimation of the 
Modified Jones model. Although this, as expected, reduces our sample sizes, the results remain 
qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper. 
7
 A Wald χ2-test of difference between the two coefficients does not reveal any statistically significant 
difference in coefficients (χ2 =0.05; n.s.). 
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 Taken together these robustness checks using alternative proxies for board 
internationalization affirm that the presence of non-Nordic foreigners on the firm’s 
board is associated with higher levels of earnings management.8 
 Finally, to check the robustness of the previous findings, we use an alternative 
measure for discretionary accruals. Though widely used in the earnings management 
literature, the modified Jones model is far from perfect in detecting earnings 
management (e.g., Katz, 2009; Dechow et al., 2010). Therefore, and as recommended 
by Peek et al. (2013), we also use the Dechow and Dichev (2002) cash flow model 
which regresses working capital accruals on current cash flow, previous year’s cash 
flow, and next year’s cash flow. Hence, abnormal accruals are set equal to the residuals 
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where CFit+τ is the cash flow from operations (i.e., current operating income minus 
accruals) of firm i in year t + τ (τ = -1, 0, 1), and the other variables are as defined 
previously. Similar to our main analyses, we estimate the models by country, industry, 
and time period, where we distinguish two time periods: 2001–2004 and 2005–2008. 
Untabulated results reaffirm the findings regarding our test variable based on the 
analyses using the Modified Jones model. 
4.4. Signed accruals 
                                                        
8
 We also performed a change specification analysis in which we tried to tease out the effects of a change 
in the presence or percentage of non-Nordic foreign directors on the change in earnings management. 
This, however, did not result in significant effects, which is probably due to the low number of 
observations involving a change in our test variable. Out of a total of 2,663 firm-year observations, 73 
(325) involving a change in D_NONNORDIC (PERC_NONNORDIC). 
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So far, we have looked at the absolute value of discretionary accruals and, hence, 
treated income-increasing (i.e., upward) and income-decreasing (i.e., downward) 
earnings management similarly. However, to create a positive impression on the firm’s 
stakeholders (e.g., by showing improved financial performance), corporate decision-
makers may be particularly likely to resort to income-increasing earnings management 
(cf. Chen et al., 2014). At the same time, income-increasing earnings management may 
not be in the best interests of (future) investors (e.g., Graham et al., 2005), when they 
base their investment decisions on reported results that are substantially higher than the 
firm’s underlying fundamentals (e.g., Davidson et al., 2004). Therefore, we conduct an 
analysis focusing on the signed accruals. The results are reported in Table 4. 
    [Insert table 4 around here]  
 Table 4 contains three columns. Column (1) shows the results based on the full 
sample. They indicate that the presence of a non-Nordic, foreign director is positively 
associated with the level of discretionary accruals (β = 0.018; p-value < 0.01). Columns 
(2) and (3) provide sub-sample results for income-increasing and income-decreasing 
earnings management, respectively. The results in columns (2) and (3) indicate that the 
presence of a non-Nordic, foreign director is positively associated with the level of 
income-increasing earnings management (β = 0.037; p-value < 0.05), but not with 
income-decreasing earnings management (β = 0.009; n.s.). These results seem to 
suggest that corporate decision makers use the board’s reduced ability to detect or 
mitigate earnings management resulting from the presence of one or more foreign board 
members by engaging in income-increasing earnings management, but not by engaging 
in income-decreasing earnings management. 
4.5. Endogeneity of foreign directors on Nordic boards 
Instrumental variables approach  
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A common problem governance researchers face is endogeneity (e.g., Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003; Adams et al., 2010). In our study, it is possible that foreign directors 
do not randomly join Nordic firms but, rather, self-select firms. To overcome this 
possible endogeneity bias, we follow prior research and use an instrumental variable 
(IV) approach where we estimate earnings management regressions in a two-stage least 
square (2SLS) framework (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Lennox et al., 2012). Consistent 
with Masulis et al. (2012) we use distance of headquarters to airport 
(DISTANCE_TO_AIRPORT) as our first instrument. DISTANCE_TO_AIRPORT 
captures “the intuition that foreign directors may prefer to sit on boards of firms whose 
headquarters they can more easily reach” (Masulis et al., 2012, p. 546). 
DISTANCE_TO_AIRPORT is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s 
headquarter is located within 50 km of the country’s international airport, and zero 
otherwise. Our second instrument is the percentage of foreign sales to total sales 
(PERC_FOREIGN_SALES). Arguably, the internationalization of the firm (for instance 
in terms PERC_FOREIGN_SALES) may explain board internationalization (i.e., explain 
why firms “demand” foreigners). Specifically, Oxelheim et al. (2013, p. 176) note that 
to deal with increased complexity due to the firm’s internationalization foreign directors 
can help to provide a firm’s board with the necessary advice, monitoring abilities and 
resources to meet the challenges of internationalization. 
 In the first stage, we estimate a probit model where the dependent variable is an 
(indicator) variable indicating whether a non-Nordic director sits on the firm’s board 
and report the results in Panel A of Table 5. As expected, we find that our IVs 
(DISTANCE_TO_AIRPORT and PERC_FOREIGN_SALES) are significantly and 
positively related to our test variable. 
    [Insert table 5 around here] 
21 
 
 In Panel B of Table 4, we estimate the second-stage regressions where the 
dependent variable is the absolute discretionary accrual and our indicator variable (i.e., 
D_NONNORDIC) is replaced by its instrumented value from the first stage. The model 
specifications are otherwise identical to those reported in our prior analyses. Results 
presented in Panel B of Table 5 show that the presence of a non-Nordic director still has 
a positive significant effect on the absolute value of discretionary accruals. The results 
affirm the evidence from the OLS regressions in prior analyses. The Hausman-test 
(significant at the 1% level) suggests that it is important to control for endogeneity in 
our analyses. The Hansen-Sargan J-statistic is not significant suggesting that the 
exclusion restriction is met so that we can conclude that the two IVs are empirically 
valid. Lastly, the partial F-statistic (16.024) is greater than 10, suggesting we have 
strong instruments.  
Propensity score matching 
Apart from the IV-approach, we used propensity score matching (PSM). The idea 
of propensity matching is to correct the estimation of the treatment effect (i.e., the 
presence of a non-Nordic director) for omitted variable bias by constructing matched 
pairs that are as similar as possible on the basis of observable characteristics (i.e., 
covariates). Such a full-dimensional matching approach can relax assumptions in OLS 
regression estimations and is therefore more robust (Armstrong et al., 2010).  
To implement this approach we first compile a sub-sample comprising all firms 
with at least one non-Nordic board member (i.e., “treatment firms”). We then derive 
propensity scores based on all explanatory variables that were also used in the 
regression of  MJ_ABSOLUTE except D_NONNORDIC, using a nearest-neighbor 
matching approach with a caliper constraint (≤ .01) to construct matched pairs (e.g., 
Erkens & Bonner, 2012). These propensity scores can be seen as the probability that a 
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board has a non-Nordic director conditional on the observed covariates. The propensity 
scores form the basis to match firms that had a non-Nordic directors with firms that had 
the closest propensity as treatment firm, but chose not to include such a director on the 
board. In other words, we use a matched-pair research design that matches a treatment 
firm (i.e., a firm that has a non-Nordic board member) with a control firm (i.e., a firm 
that does not have a non-Nordic board member) that is similar across all other observed 
covariates. The final sample includes 348 matched pairs.  
Panels A and B of Table 6 report the comparison results pre- and post-PSM, 
respectively. The results show that, after the PSM procedure, the differences in mean 
and median values of the covariates for the treatment and control firms became small 
and insignificant, suggesting our matching procedure was reasonably successful. 
[Insert table 6 around here] 
More importantly, the results show that in both pre- and post-PSM comparisons 
firms with a non-Nordic director have significantly higher levels of earnings 
management than firms without a non-Nordic director, whereas (almost) all significant 
differences in other covariates between the two groups pre-PSM disappear with the 
propensity score matched pairs post-PSM. To summarize, our findings of the PSM-
approach support the idea that, all other things being equal, the presence of a non-
Nordic board member is associated with higher levels of earnings management. 
4.6. Exploring the role of accounting knowledge and/or language 
Now that we have established that the presence of non-Nordic directors is associated 
with higher levels of earnings management, we will explore possible explanations for 
this effect. 
 First, we explore the role of accounting knowledge. As indicated in our literature 
review, recognizing possibly opportunistic accounting choices aimed at managing 
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earnings require a high degree of knowledge of accounting rules (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 
2010). We expect that while non-Nordic directors may be less familiar with local 
accounting rules (Masulis et al., 2012), they are likely to possess more knowledge of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and/or US GAAP. Hence, the 
impact of the presence of non-Nordic directors on earnings management may depend on 
whether the firm draws up its financial statements using either local GAAP or IFRS. To 
explore this possibility we look at whether a firm in a specific year adopted local (i.e., 
Nordic) GAAP or IFRS. Specifically, using data from Datastream (with missing values 
collected from firms’ annual reports), we construct an indicator variable, 
LOCAL_GAAP, that equals 1 if the firm, in a specific year, adopted local accounting 
rules, and 0 if the firm adopted IFRS or US GAAP. We then created an interaction 
variable between D_NONNORDIC*LOCAL_GAAP.9  
 Untabulated results indicate that the use of local GAAP (β = -0.021; p < 0.01) is 
negatively associated with the level of earnings management. This in line with the 
general notion that using IFRS offers more discretion to apply earnings management as 
compared to using local GAAP. Second, we show that the presence of a non-Nordic 
foreign board member is positively associated with earnings management (β = 0.030; p 
< 0.01), which corroborates our previous findings with respect to this relationship. The 
interaction between local GAAP and the presence of a non-Nordic board member is also 
significant and negative (β = -0.023, p < 0.10), indicating that the effect of non-Nordic 
board members on earnings management depends on the use of local GAAP or IFRS. 
Figure 1 suggests that levels of earnings management are higher for firms that use IFRS 
                                                        
9
 Following the recommendations of Aiken and West (1991), we standardized all continues variables 
before entering them into the regression analysis. In the regression we include all explanatory variables 
except D_PERIOD, which is highly correlated with LOCAL_GAAP. 
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and have non-Nordic individuals on the board of directors.10 In particular, it suggests 
that the negative association between using local GAAP and earnings management is 
less strong when non-Nordic individuals are on the board. This may be explained by the 
fact that these board members have less knowledge of local rules and regulations. At the 
same time, our result for the interaction term suggests that the positive association 
between using IFRS and earnings management is stronger when non-Nordic individuals 
sit on the board. This may reflect that these board members have more knowledge of the 
opportunities for earnings management under international accounting standards.    
[Insert figure 1 around here] 
To examine the role of language, we follow Brochet et al. (2013) and construct a 
LANGUAGE_DISTANCE variable. This variable uses the TOEFL scores (regarding 
average speaking proficiency in English in a country; a score ranging from 0 to 30, with 
higher scores indicating a higher level of proficiency in English) to measure the 
difficulty members from of a certain country experience when they have to speak in 
English.11 For instance, the TOEFL-score for Japan is about 16, while the U.S. and the 
U.K. score 30. Using this information, per board we construct the maximum distance 
from 30. For instance, if a Norwegian board contains a Japanese (TOEFL=16), a Dutch 
(TOEFL=25) and 3 Norwegian (TOEFL=24.5) individuals, the maximum score of 
LANGUAGE_DISTANCE for this board would be based on the Japanese individual (as 
this country scores lowest in terms of proficiency) and it would be 14. Moreover, if a 
board consisted of 12 members, 10 Swedish (TOEFL = 24.15) persons and 2 Irish folks, 
                                                        
10
 We also performed a sub-samples analysis in which we compare the 2,602 firms where 
D_NONNORDIC = 0 with the 647 firms where D_NONNORDIC = 1.The results regarding the effects of 
LOCAL_GAAP are in line with the results from the analysis based on the inclusion of an interaction 
variable. 
11
 Brochet et al. (2013, p. 17) note that “[t]he TOEFL (Test of English as a Foreign Language) is 
extensively used as an admission requirement for non-native speakers at various (primarily academic) 
institutions around the world. The test is designed and administered by the Educational Testing Service 
(ETS), and has been taken by over 27 million individuals since its introduction in 1964.” 
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LANGUAGE_DISTANCE would be 5.85. Obviously, in a board without any foreigner 
the score on LANGUAGE_DISTANCE would be 0. Untabulated results reveal no 
statistically significant associations between LANGUAGE_DISTANCE and our proxy 
for earnings management.12, 13 
5. Conclusion and limitations 
This study investigates the association of the presence of foreign directors on earnings 
management using a sample of 3,249 firm-year observations representing about 586 
non-financial listed Nordic firms during 2001–2008. We find that the presence of a non-
Nordic foreign director (i.e., directors that do not have a Nordic background) rather than 
a foreign per se, is associated with significantly higher levels of earnings management. 
We find the same result if we use alternative measures for both the presence of a non-
Nordic foreign director and earnings management. Moreover, we find evidence 
suggesting that the presence of a non-Nordic, foreign director is associated with 
income-increasing earnings management. We also deal with potential endogeneity 
issues by using an instrumental variables approach, as well as by applying propensity 
score matching, but this does not affect our main finding regarding the positive 
association between the presence of a non-Nordic foreign director the levels of earnings 
management. Finally, in this study we provide preliminary evidence that differences in 
accounting knowledge, rather than language-related factors, drive this effect.  
                                                        
12
 We also used the average language distance based per board (using TOEFL scores) and did not obtain 
significant results either. 
13
 We also constructed a measure based on the classification by Lewis (2009), a system that groups 
languages by families (e.g., Sino-Tibetan, Altaic, Indo-European). Following this classification system, 
each country is given a score based on the distance between its dominant language and English, with a 
score of 5 indicating that the language is from a different family and 1 indicating that it is the same 
language. Brochet et al. (2013, p. 16) indicate that “[t]he main advantage of this variable is that it 
accounts for fundamental differences between languages as a continuous variable, recognizing that it is 
likely easier for a non-native English speaker to learn English if her native language is in the same branch 
(e.g., German or Dutch) than if it is in a different family (e.g., Turkish or Mandarin).” The use of this 
alternative measure (again using either the maximum distance based one individual board member or an 
average distance based on all board members), did not yield significant results either. 
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These results suggest that foreign directors are less effective monitors. That is, they 
favor the interpretation that it may not necessarily be beneficial to appoint a foreign 
director to the board of directors as these directors experience monitoring deficiencies 
and, hence, are not effective in disciplining managers as far as earnings management is 
concerned. 
As any study, ours is also subject to a number of caveats. First, we focus only on 
the firms headquartered in Nordic countries. Hence, it is possible that our results are not 
generalizable to other countries that have different regulatory institutions and are 
different in terms of linguistic features. Second, although we mitigate a possible 
endogeneity problem by our 2SLS-approach and by using PSM, as in many other 
studies on boards (Adams et al., 2010), we cannot rule out endogeneity completely. 
Therefore, we interpret the results in terms of associations rather than causal 
relationships. Third, any proxy of earnings management is subjected to potential 
measurement errors (e.g., Dechow et al., 2010). We have tried to mitigate this concern 
by showing the robustness of the results to an alternative proxy for earnings 
management.  
Perhaps most importantly, however, we realize that our efforts to disentangle the 
effects of differences in accounting knowledge versus language-related factors at this 
stage may not be convincing enough. The measurement of both the differences in 
accounting knowledge and language-related factors remains rather general and indirect. 
Our measures may not properly describe the mechanisms by which lack of knowledge 
of local accounting standards and/or difficulties in communication due to language 
leads to higher levels of earnings management. Given the type of the data we have used 
(i.e. secondary data based on annual reports, websites, etc.), it seems perhaps difficult to 
open the black box of these mechanisms, however. Future research may have to 
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consider more direct ways to measure accounting knowledge and language issues to 
open up this black box. We think that studies using vignettes or experiments combined 
with questionnaires to measure (local) financial (accounting) may be fruitful to advance 
our knowledge on how (local) accounting knowledge affects earnings quality in general 
and earnings management in particular. Another valuable way to open up the black box 
involves board room observations, i.e. video analyses of board meetings and/or board 
meeting participation studies.  
Notwithstanding these caveats, our study represents an important step in 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
                     
  Mean Stdev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 MJ_ABSOLUTE 0.09 0.13 1                                 
2 D_NONNORDIC 0.20 0.40 0.057 1                               
3 BOARD_SIZE 6.92 2.09 -0.137 0.136 1                             
4 AUDITCOM 0.28 0.45 -0.042 0.234 0.340 1                           
5 CEO_BOARD 0.41 0.49 -0.010 0.018 0.157 0.053 1                         
6 TENURE_CHAIR 7.64 7.60 -0.085 -0.011 0.013 -0.049 -0.025 1                       
7 D_FEMALE 0.59 0.49 -0.046 0.093 0.393 0.249 0.033 0.028 1                     
8 FIRM_SIZE  1147.29 3727.47 -0.167 0.234 0.574 0.423 0.017 0.105 0.286 1                   
9 D_LOSS 0.28 0.45 0.149 0.067 -0.155 -0.043 -0.038 -0.215 -0.114 -0.318 1                 
10 ROA 0.03 0.27 -0.091 -0.045 0.153 0.077 -0.002 0.164 0.111 0.306 -0.552 1               
11 MTB 1.42 1.75 0.193 0.053 -0.129 -0.062 -0.013 -0.019 0.024 -0.257 0.058 -0.062 1             
12 ANALYSTCOV 6.81 9.18 -0.088 0.246 0.437 0.392 -0.042 0.017 0.241 0.753 -0.198 0.181 -0.009 1           
13 D_ANGLOLIST 0.03 0.16 -0.034 0.164 0.114 0.168 -0.016 -0.051 0.039 0.251 -0.066 0.062 -0.005 0.217 1         
14 D_PERIOD 0.57 0.50 0.081 0.064 -0.008 0.242 -0.143 0.087 0.221 0.058 -0.076 0.097 0.108 0.035 -0.016 1       
15 D_DENMARK 0.21 0.40 0.046 -0.061 -0.013 -0.183 -0.298 0.133 -0.150 -0.006 -0.054 0.006 -0.051 -0.129 0.028 -0.031 1     
16 D_FINLAND 0.21 0.41 -0.080 0.011 -0.195 0.064 -0.108 0.082 -0.173 0.104 -0.077 0.087 -0.084 0.218 0.021 -0.012 -0.263 1   
17 D_NORWAY 0.15 0.35 0.019 0.120 -0.039 -0.022 -0.201 -0.061 0.185 0.063 0.049 0.000 0.014 0.113 0.011 0.092 -0.212 -0.215 1 
18 D_SWEDEN 0.44 0.50 0.015 -0.045 0.199 0.113 0.475 -0.132 0.132 -0.126 0.072 -0.076 0.100 -0.155 -0.047 -0.031 -0.447 -0.454 -0.366 










  Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Total 
 
Number of Obs. 668 685 480 1,416 3,249 
 
D_NONNORDIC 0.151 0.207 0.315 0.179 0.199 
 
MJ_ABS 0.105 0.073 0.099 0.095 0.093 
 
      
 
 
Panel C: Breakdown per year 
 
         
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Number of Obs. 295 340 365 396 418 485 494 456 3,249 
D_NONNORDIC 0.169 0.144 0.167 0.194 0.201 0.208 0.235 0.239 0.199 
MJ_ABS 0.085 0.080 0.077 0.082 0.112 0.107 0.105 0.086 0.093 
          









 Table 2:  Regression analysis of impact of foreign directors 
on earnings management 
    
  (1) (2) 
D_FOREIGN  0.010  
  [0.007]  
D_NONNORDIC   0.022 
   [0.009]** 
BOARD_SIZE  -0.043 -0.043 
  [0.014]*** [0.014]*** 
AUDITCOM  0.002 -0.000 
  [0.008] [0.008] 
CEO_BOARD  0.013 0.012 
  [0.008] [0.008] 
TENURE_CHAIR  -0.009 -0.010 
  [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
D_FEMALE  -0.004 -0.004 
  [0.007] [0.007] 
FIRM_SIZE  -0.006 -0.006 
  [0.008] [0.008] 
D_LOSS  0.032 0.031 
  [0.008]*** [0.007]*** 
ROA  0.007 0.008 
  [0.010] [0.010] 
MTB  0.011 0.011 
  [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
ANALYSTCOV  0.006 0.005 
  [0.009] [0.009] 
D_ANGLOLIST  -0.012 -0.015 
  [0.013] [0.013] 
D_PERIOD  0.022 0.022 
  [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
INTERCEPT  0.171 0.174 
  [0.063]*** [0.063]*** 
  
  
COUNTRY  YES YES 
INDUSTRY  YES YES 
R2  0.09 0.09 
N  3,249 3,249 
    
 Notes 
Dependent variable is the absolute value of the discretionary accruals based on the Modified Jones 
model. See Appendix for variable definitions. In brackets are the standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering (Petersen, 2009).  




Table 3: Robustness checks using alternative proxies for 
board internationalization 
  (1) (2) 
    
D_NONNORDIC2  0.024  
  [0.011]**  
PERC_NONNORDIC   0.068 
   [0.030]** 
BOARD_SIZE  -0.045 -0.042 
  [0.014]*** [0.014]*** 
AUDITCOM  -0.000 -0.001 
  [0.008] [0.008] 
CEO_BOARD  0.012 0.012 
  [0.008] [0.008] 
TENURE_CHAIR  -0.010 -0.009 
  [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
D_FEMALE  -0.003 -0.004 
  [0.006] [0.007] 
FIRM_SIZE  -0.005 -0.005 
  [0.008] [0.008] 
D_LOSS  0.032 0.031 
  [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
ROA  0.006 0.006 
  [0.010] [0.010] 
MTB  0.011 0.011 
  [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
ANALYSTCOV  0.006 0.005 
  [0.009] [0.009] 
D_ANGLOLIST  -0.017 -0.016 
  [0.012] [0.012] 
D_PERIOD  0.022 0.022 
  [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
INTERCEPT  0.173 0.165 
  [0.061]*** [0.062]*** 
    
R2  0.09 0.09 
N  3,249 3,249 
  
Notes 
Dependent variable is the absolute value of the discretionary accruals based on 
the Modified Jones model. D_NONNORDIC2 is an indicator variable equal to 
1 if the board has two or more non-Nordic foreigners on the board of directors; 
and zero otherwise. PERC_NONNORDIC equals the percentage of non-Nordic 
directors in the board. See Appendix for all other variable definitions. In 
brackets are the standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) 
and firm clustering (Petersen, 2009). Country and industry fixed effects are 
suppressed for brevity. 




Table 4: Regression analysis based on signed accruals 








D_NONNORDIC 0.018 0.037 0.009 
 [0.008]** [0.014]*** [0.008] 
BOARD_SIZE 0.014 -0.023 -0.065 
 [0.012] [0.013]* [0.020]*** 
AUDITCOM 0.000 -0.003 0.002 
 [0.007] [0.011] [0.008] 
CEO_BOARD 0.007 0.022 0.003 
 [0.007] [0.013]* [0.007] 
TENURE_CHAIR 0.002 -0.011 -0.009 
 [0.003] [0.004]*** [0.004]** 
D_FEMALE 0.004 -0.006 -0.001 
 [0.006] [0.009] [0.008] 
FIRM_SIZE -0.013 -0.010 0.001 
 [0.008] [0.011] [0.010] 
D_LOSS -0.031 0.033 0.033 
 [0.008]*** [0.014]** [0.008]*** 
ROA 0.040 0.027 -0.009 
 [0.016]** [0.016]* [0.015] 
MTB 0.001 0.019 0.006 
 [0.002] [0.003]*** [0.002]*** 
ANALYSTCOV -0.003 -0.002 0.008 
 [0.009] [0.012] [0.012] 
D_ANGLOLIST -0.024 -0.033 0.006 
 [0.015] [0.012]*** [0.020] 
D_PERIOD -0.006 0.030 0.017 
 [0.005] [0.008]*** [0.006]*** 
INTERCEPT 0.068 0.188 0.149 
 [0.052] [0.081]** [0.068]** 
    
COUNTRY YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES 
R2 0.02 0.11 0.11 
N 3,249 1,640 1,609 
Notes 
In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is the value of the 
discretionary accruals based on the Modified Jones model. In column 
(3) the dependent variable is the value of the discretionary accruals 
based on the Modified Jones model multiplied by -1. See Appendix for 
all other variable definitions. In brackets are the standard errors adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering (Petersen, 
2009). Country and industry fixed effects are suppressed for brevity. 










Table 5: 2SLS regressions of impact of foreign directors 
on earnings management 
 
Panel A: First stage of 2SLS (Probit) 
PERC_FOREIGN_SALES  0.612 
  [0.239]** 
DISTANCE_TO_AIRPORT  0.282 
  [0.161]* 
BOARD_SIZE  0.069 
  [0.275] 
AUDITCOM  0.361 
  [0.126]*** 
CEO_BOARD  0.271 
  [0.149]* 
TENURE_CHAIR  0.023 
  [0.079] 
D_FEMALE  0.058 
  [0.142] 
FIRM_SIZE  0.154 
  [0.169] 
D_LOSS  0.394 
  [0.133]*** 
ROA  -0.303 
  [0.196] 
MTB  0.084 
  [0.042]** 
ANALYSTCOV  0.193 
  [0.237] 
D_ANGLOLIST  0.357 
  [0.381] 
D_PERIOD  0.047 
  [0.092] 
INTERCEPT  -3.216 
  [1.486]** 
   
INDUSTRY  YES 
COUNTRY  YES 
(Pseudo) R2  0.125 
Partial F-statistic  16.024*** 
Partial R-statistic  0.017 
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Panel B: Second stage of 2SLS 
Dependent variable: absolute discretionary accruals 
   
   
INSTR. D_NONNORDIC  0.042 
  [0.023]* 
BOARD_SIZE  -0.014 
  [0.015] 
AUDITCOM  -0.011 
  [0.010] 
CEO_BOARD  0.012 
  [0.010] 
TENURE_CHAIR  -0.006 
  [0.004]* 
D_FEMALE  0.002 
  [0.008] 
FIRM_SIZE  -0.023 
  [0.012]* 
D_LOSS  0.012 
  [0.011] 
ROA  -0.015 
  [0.022] 
MTB  0.011 
  [0.004]*** 
ANALYSTCOV  -0.003 
  [0.010] 
D_ANGLOLIST  -0.031 
  [0.015]** 
D_PERIOD  0.015 
  [0.006]** 
INTERCEPT  0.309 
  [0.127]** 
   
INDUSTRY  YES 
COUNTRY  YES 
R2  0.089 
   
Hausman test  9.104*** 
Hansen’s J  1.852 
Notes 
Dependent variable in  Panel A (first stage) is D_FOREIGN. Dependent variable 
in Panel B (second stage) is the absolute value of the discretionary accruals based 
on the Modified Jones model. PERC_FOREIGN_SALES is the percentage of 
foreign sales to total sales; DISTANCE_TO_AIRPORT  is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if the firm’s headquarters are located within 50 km of the country’s 
main international airport; and 0 otherwise. See Appendix for definitions of other 
variables. In brackets are the standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
(White, 1980) and firm clustering (Petersen, 2009). N = 1,977. 





  Table 6. Comparison between firms with non-Nordic board member and firms without non-Nordic board member, 
using propensity score matching (PSM) 
 
Panel A: Pre-PSM, differences in earnings management and covariates across two groups based on D_NONNORDIC 
Variable 
D_NONNORDIC=1 
(n = 647) 
D_NONNORDIC=0 
(n = 2,602) Difference 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median 
MJ_ABSOLUTE 0.108 0.061 0.188 0.089 0.055 0.112 0.019*** 0.006* 
BOARD_SIZE 7.535 7.000 2.313 6.772 7.000 2.005 0.763*** 0.000*** 
AUDITCOM 0.496 0.000 0.500 0.232 0.000 0.422 0.264*** 0.000*** 
CEO_BOARD 0.428 0.000 0.495 0.406 0.000 0.491 0.022 0.000 
TENURE_CHAIR 7.699 5.000 9.173 7.626 5.000 7.154 0.073 0.000 
D_FEMALE 0.682 1.000 0.466 0.566 1.000 0.496 0.115*** 0.000*** 
FIRM_SIZE (in €m) 2,718.033 395.048 5,894.770 756.717 88.174 2,820.199 1,961.317*** 306.873*** 
D_LOSS 0.338 0.000 0.474 0.263 0.000 0.440 0.075*** 0.000*** 
ROA 0.002 0.065 0.282 0.032 0.074 0.266 -0.030*** -0.009*** 
MTB 1.605 0.934 2.143 1.374 0.904 1.629 0.231*** 0.030* 
ANALYSTCOV 11.895 8.000 12.840 5.546 3.000 7.499 6.349*** 5.000*** 
D_ANGLOLIST 0.080 0.000 0.272 0.014 0.000 0.117 0.067*** 0.000*** 
D_PERIOD 0.634 1.000 0.482 0.555 1.000 0.497 0.079*** 0.000*** 







Panel B: Post-PSM, differences in earnings management and covariates across two groups based on D_NONNORDIC 
Variable 
D_NONNORDIC=1 
(n = 348) 
D_NONNORDIC=0 
(n = 348) Difference 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median 
MJ_ABSOLUTE 0.107 0.060 0.163 0.077 0.046 0.115 0.029*** 0.014*** 
BOARD_SIZE 7.161 7.000 2.214 7.207 7.000 2.096 -0.046 0.000 
AUDITCOM 0.348 0.000 0.477 0.391 0.000 0.489 -0.043 0.000 
CEO_BOARD 0.371 0.000 0.484 0.422 0.000 0.495 -0.052 0.000 
TENURE_CHAIR 7.655 5.000 8.803 7.601 5.000 6.670 0.055 0.000 
D_FEMALE 0.612 1.000 0.488 0.618 1.000 0.487 -0.006 0.000 
FIRM_SIZE (in €m) 1,482.073 182.771 3,690.652 1,342.642 200.698 4,056.292 139.431 -17.927 
D_LOSS 0.307 0.000 0.462 0.279 0.000 0.449 0.029 0.000 
ROA -0.004 0.066 0.302 0.031 0.081 0.387 -0.036 -0.015** 
MTB 1.534 0.907 1.815 1.446 0.994 1.648 0.088 -0.088 
ANALYSTCOV 8.526 5.000 10.063 7.879 5.000 8.763 0.647 0.000 
D_ANGLOLIST 0.037 0.000 0.190 0.026 0.000 0.159 0.011 0.000 
D_PERIOD 0.612 1.000 0.488 0.647 1.000 0.479 -0.034 0.000 







































local GA PIFRS 
42 
 
Appendix: Variable definitions 
 




In main tests   
MJ_ABSOLUTE 
 
Absolute value of firms i’s residuals in t from a periodical cross-
sectional estimations of the Dechow et al. (1995) model. 
D_FOREIGN 
 
Indicator variable which assumes the value of one if at least one 
foreigner is present on the board of directors; and zero otherwise. 
D_NONNORDIC 
 
Indicator variable which assumes the value of one if at least one non-
Nordic foreigner is present on the board of directors; and zero otherwise. 
BOARD_SIZE 
 
The logarithm of the number of directors. 
AUDITCOM 
 
Indicator variable which assumes the value of one if there is a separate 
audit committee; and zero otherwise. 
CEO_BOARD 
 
Indicator variable which assumes the value of one if the CEO sits on the 
board of directors; and zero otherwise. 
TENURE_CHAIR 
 




Indicator variable which assumes the value of one if the board of 
directors includes at least one female, and zero otherwise. 
FIRM_SIZE 
 




Indicator variable which assumes the value of one if the firm reported a 
loss, and zero otherwise. 
ROA 
 
Return on assets, defined as EBIT divided by total assets. 
MTB 
 




The logarithm of one plus the number of financial analysts following the 
firm (as reported in the I/B/E/S database). 
D_ANGLOLIST 
 
Indicator variable which assumes the value of one if the firm’s shares 
are cross-listed in the U.S., and zero otherwise. 
D_PERIOD 
 
Indicator variable which assumes the value of one for post-IFRS-years 
(i.e., 2005 to 2008), and zero otherwise. 
   
In robustness checks   
PERC_FOREIGN_SALES  The percentage of foreign sales to total sales. 
DISTANCE_TO_AIRPORT    Indicator variable which assumes the value of 1if the firm’s 
headquarters are located within 50 km of the country’s main 
international airport; and 0 otherwise. 
CHAIR_NONNORDIC  Indicator variable which assumes the value of one if the chairperson is a 
Non-Nordic foreigner; and zero otherwise. 
CHAIR_ANGLO 
 
Indicator variable which assumes the value of one if the chairperson is 
an Anglo-American individual; and zero otherwise. 
D_NONNORDIC2 
 
Indicator variable which assumes the value of one if at least two non-




Percentage of non-Nordic foreign directors  on the board of directors. 
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